Sometimes it is very much worth the wait before reading certain books. Too early an exposure and the substance could be misapprehended, misinterpreted, misconstrued, or simply missed. Such, I feel, is the case with Mary Doria Russell’s superb The Sparrow, which came out in 1996. I bought a copy shortly after it appeared in paperback and it has remained, unread, on my shelf since. Until this month. Why?
I don’t know, really. I started it a few times and something in the opening pages either left me unengaged or daunted. Whatever the reason, it waited till this year, and perhaps that was as it should be.
I knew enough about the novel to tell people that it is a natural successor to James Blish’s excellent novella, A Case of Conscience, which has many of the same elements. A Jesuit as member of a first contact mission to an alien world and the moral conundrum arising from certain inevitable questions. Interestingly, I find that both novels hinge on an evolutionary question going directly to matters of fundamental morality. Blish suggested powerfully that our entire conception of god and its concomitant moral structures may be simply a consequence of how we evolved. That the sociology resulting from our biology allowed for certain cross-generational assumptions which a different biological system simply wouldn’t produce.
Russell’s concept is less pat than Blish, since in many respects the biology involved is similar enough to ours to muddy those particular waters. She adds another component to the mix, though, that results in a basic difference of moral priority. In fact, in the end there’s a question of whether or not morality is relevant at all, overwhelmed by opportunity and expedience.
What we have in The Sparrow is deliciously layered examination of cultural assumptions that continues to play even after the book is finished and the afterimages begin cycling through our minds. She set a series of logical land mines throughout that set each other off with the inevitability of a Socratic dialogue.
Father Emilio Sandoz, Jesuit and linguist, a child of the slums who has through a series of fortunate accidents become more than his beginnings would ever have suggested possible, is on hand when the first evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence is discovered at the large radio array of Arecibo. After analysis, the signals resolve into music. Odd, alien music that is nevertheless compelling, a siren’s call to erstwhile explorers. There is no question upon hearing this music for Sandoz. We must go.
The mechanism by which they travel to Alpha Centauri is grounded in solid extrapolation of how space technologies may proliferate in the near future. Asteroid mining is a going activity and it is a matter mainly of financing to turn an abandoned asteroid into a starship. The Catholic Church, through the offices of the Jesuits, opts to send a mission. They ask no one’s permission, in fact pretty much tell no one that they’re going. The U.N. is debating sending a mission and later they do, but this one—the Stella Maris—is the first.
I don’t wish to spoil the plot, which, even without the substantial subtext would be a page-turner. The careful revelation of detail through which Russell presents her thesis is important to its impact, and that subtext is the whole purpose. Suffice it to say that the mission fails. Emilio Sandoz returns to Earth, a broken man, the only survivor of the party of eight.
When I say “a broken man” I mean in every sense of the phrase. His hands are a wreck, he has numerous physical problems, including scurvy, and his mind is all but gone from the trauma of the mission itself and its costs and from the fact that he was forced to make the return voyage all alone, a long journey through a deeper dark night of the soul than one might ordinarily encounter. Upon return, he is to be brought before an inquest, established by his own order, to find out the facts of the mission and determine their meaning.
Sandoz doesn’t want to cooperate. He doesn’t want to relive the events that ended in such failure nor does he want to infect anyone else with the knowledge that has caused him to renounce his faith.
Though not exactly. This is one of the interesting aspects of the layered game Russell plays throughout. It’s an open question, even at the end, whether Sandoz has in fact lost his faith. He seems to wish it, certainly, angry and bitter he is at a god by which he feels betrayed. But Sandoz is a brilliant man. He exemplifies what has become axiomatic about Jesuits and maintains his faith by dint of reason supported by a passionate belief in justice. No simple “believer” and having emerged from a hellish childhood to become one of the best linguists not only in his order but anywhere, it takes enormous challenge for him to question his commitment to a god which more facile minds would characterize as bizarrely cruel. Even at the close of the novel he is wrestling with the nature of god.
At the center of the novel is a particular formulation of the question of evil which goes to what might be termed beneficial expedience. The alien race to which he goes as linguist and missionary lives in apparent harmony with itself and its environment. A complex harmony, mirrored in the songs that are the first knowledge humankind receives of them. There is much about them that is admirable but also puzzling—until they realize that what they at first thought to be a single species is in fact two intelligent species and their evolved cohabitation of their world requires of them certain accommodations that for humans would be odious.
There is the question of judgment—not our world, not even our evolutionary history, how are we to judge? But any concept of a god as source of moral law must necessarily exhibit certain basic consistencies, regardless. There is the question of expedience—if something works not only for the individual but for the planet as a whole, again, who are we to question?
But finally, Sandoz comes face to face with the human example as baseline for any kind of moral assessment and asks: “What do we have to show as in any way superior, when the condition of our species is questionable at best?”
Russell sets a serious moral trap in this novel, leading us step by step to the point where we must look at our own condition and ask how our own apprehension of moral law plays out. Does it enforce any kind of justice? Does it bring us into harmony among ourselves and our environment? Does the dogma by which our moral adjutants dispense advice and guidance actually serve the function for which it is claimed?
Like a good Jesuit, Sandoz is still asking these questions at the end of his ordeal, and a terrible ordeal it is. On a certain level, he is brought to the condition of all colonized and oppressed peoples and made to know what it is like to have everything he believes and assumes overwritten by a more powerful circumstance. By the end he has suffered every indignity. Every single one that arises from basic injustice.
And yet the system which puts him through this is not by its own metrics oppressive—merely an embellished example of evolutionary imperative. By comparison, Sandoz wonders if the horrors of our own condition are not the results of a fundamental rejection of evolutionary imperatives, the imposition of a wholly artificial system presumed to be based on moral assessment but really little more than a gloss on power relations having little to do with anything “natural.”
In turn, one can then ask the same thing about the aliens and their relationships. If, which seems to be one of the unspoken assumptions by which Sandoz operates as a moral agent, sapience is the deciding factor in applying standards of justice and equity, then how can the two species on Rakhat maintain the self-evidently immoral system they do? By the same token, if equality is of such value to us as a basis for our moral decisions, how then can we maintain the cultural systems we do?
There is, Socratically, a dialogue at play throughout the novel, and a rigorous one at that. Each of the eight humans who go to Rakhat as well as the priests conducting the inquest represent choices and judgments based on different apprehensions of the god question. Each stands for a different set of conditions calling into question our basic assumptions about civilization and moral action. Often it’s subtle, but sometimes powerfully visceral. We realize that this is a novel which, practically from page one, takes every assertion of right and wrong and expedience and morality and says “Sure, but” in the very next passage.
Finally, it is an examination of the limits of accommodation.
The earlier novel, A Case of Conscience, asked a few of these questions, but it shied away from many others. Nor did it offer such a full range of mirrored arguments. Its conclusion was in many ways annoyingly ambiguous and turned on a question of epistemology which was less personal, less visceral than what Father Sandoz is forced to face. But there remains a line between them which is not insignificant, which is that we must ask if any conception of god is not in the end purely a matter of intellectual expedience that cannot stand up to exposure to truly different cultures and biologies. If, basically, in the end such conceptions are, like anything else, merely systems designed to see us through to the next level of understanding. They do change. The Jesuits themselves changed from their beginnings as an order dedicated to the authority of the pope and an enemy of developing knowledge to an order of the best educators and some of the finest scientists on the planet. Whether admitted or not, their conception of god changed. Sandoz is dealing with the question of how resilient any such conception is.
Or was Spinoza right and that god is simply nature and morality is ours to construct and adapt and modify? Sandoz seems at times a closet Spinozan, but as flexible as he often is, he finds his limits and snaps.
Or does he?
I’m not sure I possessed the stuff to appreciate this novel when it came out. I may not now, but I can at least see, sometimes vaguely perhaps, Russell’s intent. In any case, it was certainly worth the wait.